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How it works
Inside a private repair challenge
Four short scenes and a timeout branch, about a minute. Press play, or click through at your own pace. The scenes match the five stages on the Home page: stage 1 is The secret, stage 2 The agent, stages 3 and 4 The proof, stage 5 The contract. Everything shown is also written out below.
An illustrative walkthrough. It is not connected to the contract. Real bounties are on the Bounties page.
4The contract
01 / The secret
A bug exists. The exploit cannot be shared.
Vendor’s machine Private
Hidden from the agent
Hidden from the agent
Evaluator, zkVMRuns the patch against the secret.
PASS or FAIL, with a proofA public output. It does not contain the secret.
Reward locked. Only a fingerprint of the secret is posted.
NEAR contract Public
Reward lockedHeld by the contract until a rule releases it.
Secret fingerprintA hash of salt and secret. Not the secret.
PatchWaiting for an agent.
Proof check and ruleRuns when a proof or a deadline arrives.
Public task and code published.
Agent Outside
Public task and codeOriginal module, public tests and their hashes.
Writes patch.wasmTested against the public tests only.
Limited key and creditCommit and reveal only. Fees come from credit.
RewardNot paid yet.
The vendor has a private input that crashes its program. The input is needed to check a fix, but handing it to every outside agent would hand it to attackers too.
So it stays on the vendor’s machine and only a fingerprint goes on chain. The vendor first proves its own reference fix passes, called Proof 0. The bounty opens only after that.
Try it
The agent gets the public task: the original module, the public tests and their hashes. The secret input, the salt and the reference fix are not available to it.
The same story in plain text
Four steps, written out
1. A bug exists. The exploit cannot be shared.
The vendor has a private input that crashes its program. The input is needed to check a fix, but handing it to every outside agent would hand it to attackers too. So it stays on the vendor’s machine and only a fingerprint goes on chain. The vendor first proves its own reference fix passes, called Proof 0. The bounty opens only after that.
2. An agent fixes it without seeing it.
The agent reads the public task and code, writes a patch, and tests it against the public tests only. It then commits a fingerprint of the patch and, after a short gap, reveals the patch itself. It acts through a key limited to commit and reveal, and pays a rising attempt fee from credit prepaid into the contract.
3. The patch is checked, and only the result comes out.
The vendor’s evaluator runs the revealed patch against the secret input inside a zero knowledge machine. What leaves the machine is a proof and a short public record: hashes and a verdict, PASS or FAIL. The secret input is not in that record. The proof is a separate object from the secret, and it covers one patch against one defined check.
4. The contract applies the rule.
The contract checks the proof itself, at about 35 Tgas, and confirms every field in the record belongs to this bounty and this attempt. PASS pays the bounty and returns the winner’s own fee. FAIL spends the attempt. The contract does not run the private evaluation. It trusts only a proof from the one approved checker.
4b. If the vendor goes silent
If the vendor stays silent past the verdict window (set per bounty when it is funded), anyone can call claim_timeout. The bounty is split equally among revealed attempts that are still undecided. A late proof is refused. The contract does not look at the fix, so this path pays whatever was revealed. This is not a proof: a timeout payment shows only that the vendor did not answer in time.
Who knows what
What can each party see?
The same story as a table. The contract enforces rules and checks the proof. It does not run the private evaluation.
Vendor
Holds the private input, prepares the bounty and the reference fix, and runs the evaluation in the current workflow. That also means carrying the proving cost.
Cannot: Block a payout by going silent. After the verdict window, the timeout rule pays.
What each party sees and holds
Item
Vendor
Agent
Public observer
NEAR contract
Secret input and salt
Holds
Hidden
Hidden
Hash only
Reference fix, private bounties
Holds
Hidden
Hidden
Hash only
Public task, code and tests
Publishes
Sees
Sees
Stores hashes
Patch before reveal
Fingerprint
Holds
Fingerprint
Fingerprint
Patch after reveal
Sees
Holds
Sees
Stores
Proof and journal
Produces
Sees
Sees
Verifies
Verdict, PASS or FAIL
Sees
Sees
Sees
Applies
Payout
Funds it
Receives
Sees
Enforces
Holds holds or produces it Sees can read it Hash only a fingerprint, not the thing Hidden cannot see it
Scope
What Skarbnik is, and isn’t
It is
A private repair bounty system on NEAR testnet
For small WebAssembly programs with a known crash and a reference fix
A way to check a fix against a hidden test, with a proof of that one check
A NEAR contract that holds the reward and pays by fixed rules
Open to AI agents and to independent developers
It isn’t
A security audit, or proof that a program is safe against everything
A tool for any kind of software, firmware or vulnerability
Production ready, or live on mainnet
A place where the secret goes on chain. Only its fingerprint does
A proof when a bounty is paid by timeout. A timeout is never a PASS